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THE EXTENDED MIND 
THESIS IS ABOUT DEMARCATION 
AND USE OF WORDS
Vincent C. Müller
The «extended mind thesis» sounds like a substantive thesis, the truth of which we 
should investigate. But actually the thesis a) turns about to be just a statement on 
where the demarcations for the «mental» are to be set (internal, external,…), i.e. it 
is about the «mark of the mental»; and b) the choice about the mark of the mental 
is a verbal choice, not a matter of scientific discovery. So, the «extended mind the-
sis» is a remark on how its supporters or opponents want to use the word ‘mind’, 
not a thesis of cognitive science or philosophy. The upshot of the extended mind 
discussion should not be to draw the line further out, but to drop the demarcation 
project.
Keywords: Cognition, Cognitivism, Computationalism, Embodiment, Extended 
Mind, Mark of the Mental.
1. BACKGROUND: EMBODIED COGNITION
1.1. GOOD OLD COGNITIVE SCIENCE
This paper is an investigation of the nagging suspicion that the discus-
sion about the «extended mind thesis» is merely a discussion about 
words: a matter where a discovery is sought, but all there is to be found 
are some intuitions about the semantics of central words, such as the 
word «mind». Perhaps the discussion is pointless, even if one takes 
cognition to be embodied and embedded, as I happen to do? I want 
to advance two theses here: a) much of the extended mind discussion 
is a discussion about demarcation of the mental, and b) a discussion 
about demarcation is merely verbal, in this case. The conclusion is that 
we should not limit cognitive science to what philosophers want to call 
«cognitive» – in that sense the defenders of the «extended mind» are 
right.
In order to carry out this investigation, I will first briefly embed 
the discussion in its context of the philosophy of cognition and cogni-
tive science (with deference to Müller 2012): The good old standard 
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view of cognition is that self-contained agents pursue their own goals, 
sometime in cooperation with other agents, and sometimes using ex-
ternal tools. This typically, but not necessarily, goes together with a 
view of these agents as rational agents that perceive, then model, plan, 
and finally act; and the view that robots should be built that way: with 
sensors, central processor (to model & plan) and actuators – this view 
of agents through internal cognitive states, rather than behavioral dis-
positions, is what I would call cognitivism. Cognitivism often goes to-
gether with the view that humans and other natural cognitive agents 
are computational information processors made up of several modules 
that take in symbolic representations of the world, process these ac-
cording to specified rules and then produce a symbolic output – this 
view I call computationalism. In philosophy, cognitivism and computa-
tionalism are often take to be scientific explanations of the traditional 
view that humans have a mind and mental states, and that these states 
partially explain human behaviour. Even those that reject either one or 
both of these explanations tend to maintain that the traditional view of 
the mind is largely correct (the Churchlands are a notable exception).
1.2. THREE EMBODIMENT THESES
The rejections of some of the two traditional theses take various forms 
and there is a rather confusing landscape of options. However, one 
unifying point of criticism is that the traditional view – in distancing 
itself from its original opponent, behaviorism – puts undue emphasis 
on a central processing notion of cognition; it talks as if cognition was 
something that I, the agent, do from within my body, taking the infor-
mation from my sensory system as input, processing this and produc-
ing output in the form of actions (typically movements). This image, 
which has first been properly developed by René Descartes, talks as 
though there were a little person, a homunculus, inside me watching 
what Dennett aptly called the «Cartesian theatre» (Dennett 1991, 107) 
and taking decisions. He says: «It is a mistake to believe that the brain 
has any deeper headquarters, any inner sanctum, arrival at which is the 
necessary or sufficient condition for conscious experience» (Dennett, 
Kinsbourne 1992, 185). But not only is there no little person inside 
me and cognition cannot fruitfully be explained by this model, but the 
model seems inconsistent, even: The little person would seem to need 
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yet another little person to watch what he/she is doing, etc. – or, in a 
different terminology, the information would have to be «encoded» in 
some way, which results in a need for further decoding of the decoding 
(Bickhard 1993). 
Instead of this image, we need to take in many of the cognitive 
features of the agent that only come into existence due to the inter-
action with the environment. Also, it seems that any symbols in the 
cognitive systems need to have «grounding» (Harnad 1990) in physical 
interaction with the world, in order to be meaningful for the system. 
The cognitive system is thus embodied in the sense of a «dynamical 
interaction (coupling) of an embodied system that is embedded in the 
surrounding environment» […] «it never goes completely formal» 
(Calvo-Garzón 2006, 7, 20)
The rejections of cognitivism and the rejection of computation-
alism are often lumped into one, presumably because a rejection of 
cognitivism is thought to imply a rejection of computationalism – but 
this might not be true (certainly not for pancomputationalists) and the 
inverse is clearly not true. Descartes was not a computationalist, but he 
surely was a cognitivist.
In my view, the thesis that «cognition is embodied» takes three 
main forms:
1. Embodiment as an empirical thesis. For example:
– sensation and experience require movement (e.g. of eyes or 
percept), so perception is a kind of action (Myin, O’Regan 2006; 
Noë 2005) and we should really speak of a «sensorimotor sys-
tem» rather than «sensory system»;
– conscious experience is action experience (O’Regan 2011).
2. Embodiment as an engineering thesis. For example:
– many tasks can be achieved by active control or by body mor-
phology (e.g. running) (Müller, Hoffmann 2017; Pfeifer, Bon-
gard 2007);
– body involvement is a design choice (e.g. active sensing) […] 
(Cangelosi, Riga 2006).
3. Embodiment as a metaphysical thesis. For example:
– there can be no disembodied homunculus inside watching a 
«Cartesian theatre» (Dennett);
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– there can be no meaningful symbols in a cognitive system with-
out embodiment and embeddedness (Hutto, Myin 2012).
I think it will become clear shortly that the extended mind thesis 
is first and foremost a metaphysical thesis, which then has an empirical 
consequence (the human mind is often extended) and an engineering 
consequence (it does not matter where you locate the resources for a 
cognitive function). But what is the thesis?
2. EXTENDED MIND
2.2. EXPOSITION
Andy Clark and David Chalmers (Clark, Chalmers 1998) have pro-
posed the much-discussed thesis that cognitive processes of humans 
can and do take place outside the head; in particular that artifacts we 
use, like notebooks or electronic devices are part of our cognitive ap-
paratus. We are thus, in the words of Clark’s book titles «Natural Born 
Cyborgs» (Clark 2003) with «Supersized Minds» (Clark 2008). 
Clark and Chalmers show a number of examples where it does 
not seem to matter whether the human cognitive activity takes places 
‘in the head’ or outside: rotating blocks mentally or physically (to see 
whether they would fit a gap in the computer game «Tetris»), touch-
ing something with hands or a stick, counting in the head vs. with 
fingers and, finally, Inga and Otto who have the belief that «The Mu-
seum of Modern Art is on 53rd Street». Since beliefs are still the staple 
‘mental state’ for most philosophers, this example in (Clark, Chalmers 
1998) has produced the most debate: Inga knows there the museum 
is because she remembers it, quite normally. Otto also knows where 
the museum is, but he has Alzheimer’s Disease and thus keeps such 
information in a notebook that he can consult. If you find the idea of 
the notebook to ‘external’, imagine that Otto has a brain implant that 
functions as his notebook. Also note, that we quite naturally say such 
things as «I know what time it is» (because I have a watch) or «I be-
lieve I have an appointment» (my smartphone says so).
So we have extended mental processes (like mental rotation), ex-
tended perception and extended belief – in short, the extended mind.
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The main line of the extended mind thesis is summarized in 
what Clark calls a Parity Principle:
If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process 
which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recogniz-
ing as part of a cognitive process, then that part of the world is (so we 
claim) part of the cognitive process ( Clark 2008, 114-115; Clark, Chalm-
ers 1998, 8).
This principle is meant to overcome the traditional image which is 
«in the grip of a simple prejudice: the prejudice that whatever matters 
about mind must depend solely on what goes on inside the biological 
skin-bag, inside the ancient fortress of skin and skull» (Clark 2000). 
Instead, we should accept that «non-biological resources, if hooked 
appropriately into processes running in the human brain, can form 
parts of larger circuits that count as genuinely cognitive in their own 
right» (Clark 2009) It does not matter that these processes are not 
biological and it does not matter how they are hooked into the pro-
cesses – using perceptual apparatus (as in the notebook) is just as ac-
ceptable as a more direct brain interface. What matters is that they are 
intuitively mental, in particular they function as such. So, the extended 
mind thesis is that mental processes do not only take place inside the 
skull or skin.
2.2. CLARIFICATIONS
The extended mind thesis belongs in the tradition that rejects cognitiv-
ism, but it also has older pedigree; e.g. (Sprevak 2009) argued convinc-
ingly that is really follows from good old functionalism. This relation 
still produces some debate, however (Miyazono 2017). Functionalism 
says only the process counts, not where it is, but an internalist might 
reject this principle, perhaps in favour of a new internalist parity prin-
ciple that says location matters (Coleman 2011, 105). Note that rather 
than having human cognition extended via artifacts, there could also 
be artificial cognition extended via humans – this interesting idea (con-
sonant with Clark’s overall direction of the cyborg) is investigated in 
(Smart 2018).
It seems that the extended mind thesis does not belong to the 
group of views that reject computationalism, or representationalism in 
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the philosophy of mind. Dreyfus points out what Clark and Chalmers 
retain of the Cartesian picture: 
Wheeler’s cognitivist misreading of Heidegger leads him to overestimate 
the importance of Andy Clark’s and David Chalmers’ attempt to free us 
from the Cartesian idea that the mind is essentially inner by pointing out 
that in thinking we sometimes make use of external artifacts like pen-
cil, paper, and computers. Unfortunately, this argument for the extended 
mind preserves the Cartesian assumption that our basic way of relating 
to the world is by using propositional representations such as beliefs and 
memories whether they are in the mind or in notebooks in the world. In 
effect, while Brooks happily dispenses with representations where coping 
is concerned, all Chalmers, Clark, and Wheeler give us as a supposedly 
radical new Heideggerian approach to the human way of being in the 
world is to note that memories and beliefs are not necessarily inner enti-
ties and that, therefore, thinking bridges the distinction between inner and 
outer representations (Dreyfus 2009, 52).
So, while the extended mind thesis is a metaphysical embodiment the-
sis, it is fairly moderate in that it rejects neither central processing nor 
representation and computation. Its implications for engineering and 
empirical study are thus less straightforward than those of its more 
radical cousins.
2.3 IS THERE AN ARGUMENT?
Opponents have spent a lot of time on discussing examples where the 
extended mind thesis seems more or less plausible. They have urged us 
not to confuse «part the mechanism» with «doing cognition» (Adams, 
Aizawa 2007) – but which parts are doing ‘cognition’, which parts are 
constitutive, are only central parts doing cognition, are any parts doing 
cognition without the whole, are there distinguishable parts, etc. etc.? 
For example, Kirchhoff is trying to distinguish «constituents of cogni-
tive systems from resources having a mere causal influence on cogni-
tive systems» (Kirchhoff 2017). It is easy to see that this discussion can 
go on forever (some philosophers will think that is good news). I think 
this discussion is pointless because the extended mind thesis is a thesis 
on how to use the words ‘cognitive’ or ‘mental’.
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2.4. COLEMAN
To start supporting this view it is important to look at the relation 
between the parity principle and the extended mind thesis. Sam 
Coleman has suggested that «Clark and Chalmers beg the question 
by employing their parity principle rather than the internalist one. I 
conclude that they fail to provide a proper argument to support the 
extended mind thesis» (Coleman 2011, 100). It is right that Clark and 
Chalmers rely on the parity principle and this principle might be un-
palatable to some, especially when they see that it generates externalist 
consequences. But of course Clark and Chalmers are not just begging 
the question: At the very least they show that if one accepts the parity 
principle, it turns out that a number of human mental processes actu-
ally do take place outside the human body, that there is an «extended 
mind», so they do provide support for a conditional thesis: If the par-
ity principle is true, then the extended mind thesis is true. Also, they 
argue for the plausibility of their antecedent, the parity principle. But 
not everybody is impressed.
2.5. FODOR
For example, the most prominent opponent, the late Jerry Fodor, 
thinks Clark’s argument for the external mind just boils down to a 
«slippery slope» argument: Because there is a gradual move from mind 
to external, therefore there is no difference between mind and exter-
nal. This would be a fallacy, of course: Just because there is no sharp 
cut-off between mental and non-mental, this does not mean there is no 
distinction (Fodor 2009).
In this review of (Clark 2008), Fodor complains about impres-
sionistic and metaphorical exposition and finds it just incredible that 
a mind has parts or that some of my mind should be outside my body. 
He says that he does not know how to cash in the ‘parity principle’ 
because he is not sure what is «part of a cognitive process» and that 
external objects lack (underived) intensionality, the hallmark of the 
mental. He says «what one thinks about the parity principle itself de-
pends on what one thinks about EMT [extended mind thesis]. If it’s 
your view (as I guess it’s mine) that mental events are ipso facto ‘in-
ternal’, then you will, of course, deny that something that happens on 
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the outside could be mental» (Fodor 2009, 14). In other words, the 
principle begs the question. 
Pierre Jacob seems to put his finger on what is actually at issue 
here when he says that the extended mind thesis is a way to express the 
embodied mind thesis (Jacob 2012).
2.6. WILSON
What is actually at stake in the debate is not so easy to say. In his use-
ful collection, Robert Wilson distinguishes not less than ten different 
questions and he seems to assume that there is a substantive dispute 
here, between different views of cognition (and sides with the exter-
nalists). I want to argue that one of these «7. Sometimes I wake up 
at night and worry that this is all merely a terminological or semantic 
matter» (Wilson 2014, 24f) is roughly the right worry.
Wilson does not agree and says that «there is an empirical fact of 
the matter in at least some cases» and then cites an «integratively cou-
pled system containing cognitive resources» (and some stories about 
digestion) – but that is surely precisely the kind of case that does not 
impress internalists, who would say that this is a system where cogni-
tive processes are coupled with others to achieve certain performance 
or output. The importance of interaction and external tools in the un-
derstanding of natural cognition that people like David Kirsh (Kirsh 
2009; 2010) do such valuable work on says nothing about which of 
these processes we should count as «cognitive» or not. Nothing of this 
sort will convince an internalist.
3. A VERBAL DISPUTE?
3.1. THE MARK OF THE COGNITIVE – ROWLANDS
Some authors (not discussed by Wilson) take on this demarcation 
problem directly. If the question is not «how does cognition work?» 
but «what out of all this should we count as cognition?», then we have 
a different issue. Adams and Aizawa use the notion of «the mark of the 
cognitive» to support a distinction between processes that are consti-
tutive of cognition and those that merely contribute causally (Adams 
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2010; Adams, Aizawa 2007). In other words, they suggest that in order 
to settle the «where» question, we need to settle the «what» criterion.
Clark describes his own view as that «according to which thinking 
and cognizing4 may, at times, depend directly and noninstrumentally 
upon the ongoing work of the body and/or the extraorganismic envi-
ronment.» (Clark 2008, xxviii). And the crucial endnote 4 reads: «The 
term cognizing is here used to mark a notion of the mental that is broad-
er than the one suggested by introspection and common sense alone. 
Where introspection and common sense might identify mind simply as 
a locus of beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, and so forth, the scope of the cog-
nitive may include states and operations unearthed by science», what 
I want to suggest is that we should stop granting special status to the 
«common sense» notion of «mind» (the Churchlands had told us so).
Mark Rowlands agrees that finding the «mark of the cognitive» 
(Rowlands 2009, 2010) is central, and so does (Pernu 2017). Rowlands 
discusses what he calls Adams’ and Aizawa’s «The Mark of the Cog-
nitive Objection»: «EM [extended mind] should be rejected on the 
grounds that it is incompatible with any plausible mark of the cogni-
tive; that is, any criterion that specifies the conditions under which a 
process qualifies as cognitive. This objection is developed by Adams 
and Aizawa (2001; 2009)» (Rowlands 2009, 2).
Rowlands briefly considers the possibility that a «mark» may not 
be needed but dismisses it, saying: «Underlying this attitude is the idea 
that science simply does what it does – identifies its laws and constructs 
its theories – and, as long as it can do this, has no need for any deeper 
understanding of what it is doing. Thus, it might be argued, we have 
an adequate intuitive grasp of what counts as cognitive, and this grasp 
is sufficient for us to adjudicate the claims of EM» (Rowlands 2009, 
7). This is gesturing: The onus is on the discussants of the conceptual 
issues to show that there is a «deeper understanding» to be had here, 
in fact that there is a demarcation to be found. In any case, this is not 
the position I want to suggest here: It is not that I have an «intuitive 
grasp» and judge the demarcation from there, but rather that I suggest 
we should stop searching for that demarcation (b) and that the issue 
boils down to demarcation (a).
Let us look at his proposal:
A process P is a cognitive process if and only if:
(1) P involves information processing – the manipulation and transforma-
tion of information-bearing structures.
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(2) This information processing has the proper function of making avail-
able either to the subject or to subsequent processing operations informa-
tion that was (or would have been) prior to (or without) this processing, 
unavailable.
(3) This information is made available by way of the production, in the 
subject of P, of a representational state.
(4) P is a process that belongs to the subject of that representational state 
(Rowlands 2009, 8).
Of course I do not pretend to discuss these deep matters here; 
I only say that a lot of this will depend on the terminological choices 
one has already made, on the intuitions one brings to bear. So on my 
diagnosis, Rowlands understands correctly that the mark of the cogni-
tive is central to the extended mind debate (my thesis a), but he makes 
the wrong assumption that there is a factual empirical question here 
where that «mark» is to be found (against my thesis b). 
Some argue that the mark of the cognitive is a real empirical 
question that can be advanced scientifically (Varga forthcoming) – but 
the same idea is assumed here: There is a mark, so let us find it. Varga 
wants «to avoid an unproductive stalemate», and thus says «it would 
be beneficial to offer independent support for the choice of a coarse-
grained notion [of cognition] beyond the claim that it is consistent 
with intuitions about folk-psychology» (3). This is a polite way of say-
ing that if we do not find independent support for a particular notion 
of «cognition», then we are at an unproductive stalemate. My point 
exactly: we are at such a stalemate and the consequence is to stop this 
discussion about demarcation, not to keep searching for a «mark».
My objection is not that the extended mind thesis violates a 
mark of the cognitive that I wish to support, but that it assumes there 
is a mark of the cognitive, and thus a substantive question where the 
demarcation really is. «Cognition» is not a natural kind term.
3.2. WE NEED NO MARK OF THE COGNITIVE – ALLEN
Do people doing the actual work in cognitive science need a solution to 
this demarcation problem? It does not look like that, since this discus-
sion is mostly just ignored by «practitioners». Some have been more 
explicit: «Philosophers seeking a unique «mark of the cognitive» […] 
are working at a level of analysis upon which hangs nothing that either 
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cognitive scientists or philosophers of cognitive science should care 
about. […] The term «cognition» is at a level of description that is too 
general to be worth defining precisely or characterizing categorically» 
(Allen 2017, 4233). Allen discusses tendencies to expand the notion 
of cognition given discoveries about organisms (plants, bacteria) and 
collectives (swarms, human groups) and advocates a «relaxed plural-
ism» for cognition. He rightly says «a definition of cognition is less 
important than attention to theories and models of specific capacities» 
(Allen 2017, 4237) In a sense that is Clark’s point: Let us not allow 
some philosophers to limit what cognitive scientists can look at; let us 
adopt Allen’s «relaxed pluralism».
4. CONCLUSION: VERBAL DISPUTES AND REALISM
If we consider the full picture of «cognition», we can not restrict our-
selves to what is «inside the skin», we must allow for cooperation, even 
intelligence of complex wholes (like «swarms»), for cognitive offload-
ing onto the environment and culture (Hutchins 2011), for construc-
tion of our own cognitive niche (Clark 2006; 2008, 61ff) and we must 
remember that much of the abilities of agents are due to the morphol-
ogy of their bodies (Müller, Hoffmann 2017; Pfeifer, Bongard 2007). 
This does not mean, however, that we must conclude that «the mind 
is extended» but that we must forget about describing the abilities of 
such agents and systems in terms of «minds» and their location. 
As (Allen 2017) stresses, the actual work on the cognitive sys-
tems and organisms is untouched by our verbal disputes. Where the 
«mark of the mental» lies it is a conceptual question and we very likely 
can’t settle it – because what we have to rely on are vague intuitions 
on the use of an English word (for which there is no correlate in other 
languages) and a discredited philosophical tradition. We are in a situa-
tion of «conceptual relativity» (Putnam 1981) where no natural kind is 
to be found and several conceptual schemes are possible. Instead, we 
must admit that out perspectives and explanatory purposes determine 
where we want to make the «cut» – and then the best explanation 
wins, whether it involves only systems inside a skin or not.
I conclude that the discussion about the «extended mind» comes 
down to a discussion about demarcation of cognition (thesis a) and 
that this discussion about demarcation is merely verbal and thus to be 
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avoided (thesis b). It has been an excellent ‘intuition pump’, however, 
that has brought out a number of interesting aspects of the philosophy 
of cognitive science. And Clark was very right to demand rejection of 
«the prejudice that whatever matters about mind must depend solely 
on what goes on inside the biological skin-bag»: We do not have a 
mark of the mental, so there is no reason to draw hard limits, either at 
the skin-bag or anywhere else.
Generally speaking, the notion of the «mind» has been especial-
ly dangerous in the past, a place where our «intuitions» have lead us 
astray (e.g. to souls and dualism). This is a dangerous four-letter word 
and I would suggest to ban it from philosophical and scientific dis-
course altogether. Let us get back to cognitive science and philosophy.
Vincent C. Müller
University of Leeds & Anatolia College/ACT
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